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Abstract This	paper	reports	on	the	analysis	of	an	online	forum	on	the	UK’s	National	Health	Service	website	where	participants	debated	the	provision	of	homeopathy	as	publicly	funded	medical	treatment.	Using	membership	categorisation	analysis,	this	paper	looks	at	how	members	negotiated	a	category	distinction	between	homeopathy	and	‘orthodox	Western	medicine’,	focussing	on	the	discursive	resources	that	the	participants	drew	on	to	position	each	other	and	the	website	itself	in	moral	terms.		This	analysis	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	the	institutionalisation	of	complementary	and	alternative	medicine	by	demonstrating	the	strong	polarisation	of	views	that	are	present	in	the	public	domain,	and	the	ways	that	public	institutions	become	held	accountable	to	ideologies	of	evidence	and	choice.	In	this	way,	the	study	adds	to	our	growing	knowledge	about	public	engagement	in	pluralistic	healthcare	systems,	showing	further	the	limitations	of	the	‘rational	choice’	assumptions	that	underlie	pluralism.		
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Introduction	
	By	some	measures	homeopathy	is	now	one	of	the	most	popular	forms	of	complementary	and	alternative	medicine	(CAM),	with	particularly	high	usage	in	northern	Europe	(Ernst,	2016;	Fischer	et	al.,	2014;	Hart,	2018;	Ong	et	al.,	2005)	where	it	is	delivered	as	part	of	the	national	healthcare	systems	in	countries	including	the	UK	(Turner,	2017),	Denmark	and	France	(Frank,	2002).	However,	as	a	paradigm,	homeopathy	is	essentially	‘heretical’	(Jones,	2004)	as	it	breaches	central	tenets	of	the	orthodox	Western	model	(Turner,	2017).	In	particular,	it	uses	highly	diluted	treatments	that	are	said	(by	Western	medicine)	to	contain	no	molecular	content	other	than	water	(Cucherat	et	al.,	2000);	it	tailors	treatments	to	individuals	rather	than	using	a	generalised	evidence	base	of	effectiveness	to	make	prescription	decisions;	and	it	often	uses	one	treatment	to	cure	multiple	ailments,	rather	than	using	combinations	of	treatments.	Some	clinical	trials	and	systematic	reviews	have	revealed	no	clear	evidence	that	homeopathy	produces	change	beyond	the	effects	of	placebo	(Cucherat	et	al.,	2000;	Shang	et	al.,	2005;	Vallance,	1998).	However,	other	reviews	suggest	that	there	is	no	clear	evidence	either	for	or	against	homeopathy’s	effectiveness	(Mathie,	2015),	and	yet	others	assert	a	positive	effect	for	homeopathy	beyond	placebo	(Waisse,	2017).	In	the	light	of	the	lack	of	a	
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decisive	evidence	base,	there	has	been	heavy	criticism	of	homeopathy’s	inclusion	in	state	care	regimes	(Hansen	and	Kappel,	2010).			In	this	context,	important	questions	arise	around	people’s	understand	of	homeopathy	and	how	they	make	sense	of	it	in	relation	to	other	forms	of	treatment	(Broom	et	al.,	2013).	A	core	discourse	that	is	used	to	talk	about	pluralistic	healthcare	systems	is	that	of	rational	‘consumer’	choice,	where	it	is	assumed	that	patients	act	systematically	in	making	decisions	about	their	healthcare.	This	idea	has	been	heavily	questioned,	with	clear	evidence	that	people’s	experiences	and	orientations	to	‘complementary’	medicine	are	far	more	complex	than	such	rationalistic	models	imply	(Broom	et	al.,	2013;	Kirby	et	al.,	2015).	People	use	diverse	knowledge	sources,	including	non-scientific	knowledge	to	build	their	understanding	of	healthcare	(Willis	et	al.,	2016).	Where	knowledge	is	‘clinically	based’	it	is	often	encountered	within	complex	socio-political	institutions	of	healthcare,	where	the	institutional	processes	such	as	systems	of	clinical	governance	and	clinical	decision-making	impact	on	people’s	understanding	and	engagement	with	clinical	knowledge	(Collyer	et	al.,	2015).	Further,	the	stances	that	people	adopt	in	interactions	with	knowledge	providers	such	as	doctors	and	nurses	are	extremely	diverse,	and	involve	epistemic	processes	other	‘rational	choice’	(Lupton,	1997).			In	this	paper	my	interest	is	in	contributing	to	debates	about	public	experiences	and	understanding	of	CAM	by	exploring	how	participants	in	an	online	forum	discursively	positioned	homeopathy	and	orthodox	medicine	in	relation	to	each	other.	Through	the	analysis	I	will	show	that	the	notion	of	rational	choice	has	no	
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relationship	to	the	complex	ways	that	evidence	was	used	as	a	discursive	tool	in	this	forum.	In	particular,	I	will	show	that	the	concept	of	evidence	was	used	in	polarised	and	restricted	ways,	and	that	it	was	employed	as	much	more	than	simply	a	tool	to	inform	decision	making,	and	became	a	resource	to	make	ideological	claims	about	what	healthcare	systems	should	look	like.			I	should	emphasise	from	the	outset	that	this	paper	does	not	aim	to	take	sides	in	the	debate	about	the	public	funding	of	homeopathy,	or	to	support	or	undermine	any	of	homeopathy’s	empirical	claims	to	effectiveness.	Rather,	the	intention	is	to	analyse	the	formation/negotiation	of	discourses	about	evidence	in	healthcare	provision	and	how	the	notion	of	‘evidence’	is	used	within	them.			
Discourses of efficacy and evidence in homeopathy and Orthodox medicine 	For	the	last	twenty-odd	years	healthcare	provision	has	been	dominated	by	the	discourse	of	evidence	based	medicine	(EBM).	The	EBM	movement	is	characterised	by	a	commitment	to	using	experimental	studies	and	systematic	reviews	to	create	generalised	statements	of	evidence	for	the	effectiveness	or	otherwise	of	medicine	and	treatment.		There	is	a	divergence	in	the	homeopathic	community	between	those	who	regard	EBM	as	anathema	to	their	emphasis	on	holistic	healing	(Borlescu,	2011;	Gonzalez	Korzeniewski	et	al.,	2006),	and	those	who	see	it	as	a	legitimate	form	of	evidence	(Degele,	2005).		As	has	happened	in	other	forms	of	alternative	medicines	(Saks,	2003),	some	homeopaths	have	orientated	to	the	orthodoxies	of	clinical	effectiveness	in	making	justification	for	their	practices	as	
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scientifically	valid	(Barcan,	2011).	In	this	way,	there	is	a	kind	of	‘rationalising’	and	‘professionalising’	of	homeopathic	practices	(Salkeld,	2005;	Welsh	et	al.,	2004)	in	relation	to	biomedical	‘hegemony’	(Lambert,	2006).	The	rationalisation	of	alternative	medicine	into	a	form	that	is	‘more	or	less’	compatible	with	orthodox	Western	medicine	has	been	shown	to	be	a	key	aspect	of	CAMs’	integration	into	traditional	medical	practice	(e.g.	Villanueva-Russell's	2005).	Similarly,	some	homeopaths	have	attempted	to	produce	explanations	of	how	homeopathy	might	work	in	terms	of	medical	science	(Degele,	2005),	referring,	for	instance,	to	quantum	theory	as	a	means	of	describing	the	ways	that	water	may	‘remember’	the	properties	of	ingredients	(Borlescu,	2011).	Degele	(2005)	describes	such	strategies	as	forms	of	‘legitimating	practices’	that	situate	the	community	within	the	prevailing	medical	discourses.	Here	I	will	use	the	term	‘assimilation	practices’	as	it	makes	clearer	the	form	that	the	legitimising	takes	(i.e.	it	assimilates	itself	into	Western	medical	knowledge	frameworks).			These	assimilation	practices	contrast	with	the	‘differentiating	practices’	found	in	more	traditional	homeopaths,	who	see	EBM	as	contradictory	to	homeopathy.	Homeopathic	diagnosis	is	said	to	work	as	a	complex	interactional	process	between	homeopath	and	patient,	which	is	not	replicable	in	randomised	controlled	trials	(RCTs)	precisely	because	the	latter	attempts	to	isolate	the	impact	of	the	doctor	from	the	effect	of	the	drug.	As	Barcan	(2011)	notes,	any	therapy	that	is	interested	in	bespoke	treatments	tailored	to	individual	patients	cannot	legitimately	use	standardised	testing	as	a	measure	of	effectiveness.	In	these	homeopathic	approaches,	there	is	also	sometimes	an	adherence	to	spiritualist	explanations	to	
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account	for	why	homeopathic	treatment	might	work,	with	the	idea	of	‘life	force’	being	one	particularly	prominent	idea	(Frank,	2002;	Borlescu,	2011).			It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	homeopathy’s	ideological	resistance	to	EBM	is	paralleled	in	some	ways	in	the	medical	community	itself,	who	have	emphasised	the	limitations	of	a	generalised	evidence	base	(Kirmayer,	2012),	the	idea	that	EMB	devalues	professional	judgement	(Friedson,	1988;	Goldenberg,	2006),	and	the	importance	of	patients’	life	narratives	over	generalised	evidence	(Frankford,	1994;	Greenhalgh,	2006).	As	such,	in	spite	of	its	discursive	dominance	in	policy	circles,	EBM	remains	an	area	of	substantial	debate	in	medical	practice.		The	forum	that	I	analyse	here	can	be	understood	as	occurring	in	the	context	of	these	debates,	and	my	analysis	will,	in	part,	be	concerned	with	understanding	the	relationship	between	these	different	areas	of	discourse	practice	and	the	positioning	strategies	of	the	participants	in	the	forum.	More	generally	though,	my	interest	is	in	understanding	how	participants	characterise	homeopathy	as	a	practice	and	the	role	of	evidence	in	this	process.		
 
A methodological framework for the analysis of discourse 	The	analysis	aims	to	contribute	to	discourse	studies	of	communicative	practice	in	online	health	forums	(Donelle	and	Hoffman-Goetz,	2008).	Here,	I	draw	on	Jones’	definition	of	discourse	analysis	as	‘the	way	people	build	and	manage	their	social	worlds	using	various	semiotic	systems’	(Jones	et	al.	2015:	4).	The	particular	
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analytic	approach	employed	here	draws	on	interactionist	approaches	to	the	study	of	discourse	(Giles	et	al.,	2014),	which	treat	discourse	not	as	an	abstract	system	of	meaning	but	as	practices	of	meaning-making	that	are	manifest	in	communication.		Discourse	methods	have	been	used	to	look	at	numerous	health-related	topics	in	online	forums,	including	the	management	of	topics	in	diabetes	forums	(Armstrong	et	al.,	2012);	managing	information	about	health	in	Canadian	aboriginal	communities	(Donelle	and	Hoffman-Goetz,	2008);	evaluating	the	accuracy	of	online	recommendations	by	peers	in	online	diabetes	forums	(Hoffman-Goetz	et	al.,	2009);	and	assessing	the	negotiation	of	‘membership’	in	an	online	forum	on	anorexia	(Stommel	and	Koole,	2010).	Studies	such	as	these	have	revealed	the	complex	ways	that	online	communities	operate	as	systems	of	knowledge,	highlighting	in	particular	the	importance	of	membership	negotiation	and	its	relationship	to	knowledge	claims.			My	analysis	draws	on	membership	categorisation	analysis	(MCA)	(Sacks,	1992),	which	looks	at	how	categories	are	used	by	people	in	their	interactions	with	one	another.	Categories	are	described	by	Housley	and	Fitzgerald	(2009:	246)	as:		
…recognizable	resources	for	members	in	their	attempts	to	constitute	opinion,	
make	evaluations,	promote	specific	world	views,	assess	practices	and	thereby	
constitute	local	configurations	of	moral	organization	and	sense.		The	‘moral	organisation’	of	categories	is	a	core	component	of	their	interactional	work,	and	refers	to	the	idea	that	categories	can	be	used	to	explicitly	or	implicitly	produce	a	moral	position	–	e.g.	to	make	a	claim	about	what	some	state	of	
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affairs/set	of	people/kind	of	activity	is	or	should	be	(Jayyusi,	2014).	MCA	examines	the	types	of	categories	that	people	use,	the	types	of	cultural	associations	that	they	relate	to	and,	ultimately,	the	ways	that	people	use	them	to	assert	positions,	make	aesthetic	judgements	and	so	on.			To	give	an	example	of	this	form	of	analysis	in	an	online	context,	Hall	and	Gough	(2011)	looked	at	how	the	category	‘metrosexual’	was	invoked	and	related	to	other	‘category	predicates’	of	associated	activity	(like	‘personal	grooming’	and	‘an	interest	in	fashion’)	in	the	online	comments	section	of		a	men’s	health	magazine.	The	analysis	explored	how	the	category	work	was	situated	in	the	broader	categories	of	sexuality	used	in	society,	showing	that	the	categories	of	masculinity	were	both	being	challenged	and	re-produced	within	the	metrosexual	identity.			It	is	beyond	the	remit	of	this	paper	to	outline	in	detail	the	methodological	character	of	MCA,	which	has	been	described	in	detail	elsewhere	(see	for	example	Jayyusi	(2014)).	In	the	following	analysis,	I	am	concerned	particularly	with	understanding	how	the	category	of	homeopathy	was	described	as	a	form	of	practice	in	relation	to	orthodox	medicine,	and	the	way	that	evidence	was	invoked	as	a	‘category	predicate’	or	relational	category	to	characterise	that	relationship.			
Methods 	This	study	analysed	the	comments	thread	on	a	page	from	the	UK’s	National	Health	Service	website	(National	Health	Service,	2015);	the	comments	have	been	
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removed	from	the	website	since	this	analysis	was	conducted	so	that	it	now	only	includes	information	and	no	public	discussion.	The	webpage	provides	information	about	what	homeopathy	is,	its	evidence	base,	and	its	central	principles,	and	previously	contained	a	comments	thread	for	registered	users	to	leave	comments	on	its	content.	The	website	has	been	subject	to	substantial	controversy	following	reports	from	UK	national	newspaper	The	Guardian	(Boseley,	2013)	that	the	Department	of	Health	had	produced	a	more	homeopathy	friendly	version	of	the	site	after	lobbying	by	the	Prince	Charles’	Charity	the	‘Foundation	of	Integrated	Medicine’.	The	Guardian	presented	the	story	with	the	implicit	idea	that	the	Department	of	Health	was	giving	unscientific	and	biased	information	to	the	public.	The	site	itself	was	actually	changed	in	November	2012,	prior	to	the	Guardian’s	report.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	the	discussion	board	was	managed	by	a	private	marketing	company	and	that	the	posts	may	have	be	moderated	by	this	company	and	as	such,	some	posts	might	well	have	been	blocked,	deleted	or	altered.	As	such,	this	is	not	an	entirely	‘naturally	occurring’	discourse	space,	but	one	that	is	managed	and,	potentially	at	least,	modified.		The	comments	thread	consisted	of	125	posts	in	total	at	the	point	of	data	collection.	The	first	contribution	to	the	forum	was	made	in	May	2009	and	the	last	one	in	my	data	set	was	given	on	14	August	2014.	When	the	forum	was	last	visited	in	May	2016,		there	were	an	extra	17	posts,	which	were	not	included	in	the	analysis.	The	comments	in	the	data	set	were	given	by	85	different	participants,	most	of	whom	(63)	posted	only	one	message,	with	only	16	people	posting	more	than	once	(see	Table	1	for	an	outline	of	the	frequencies	of	contributions).	The	comments	were	not	generally	‘conversational’	as	participants	did	not	engage	in	back	and	forth	
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dialogue;	however,	contributors	frequently	did	address	their	comments	to	existing	posts.	When	participants	posted	more	than	once,	this	was	usually	either	to	qualify	or	expand	on	an	adjacent	or	proximally	close	posting,	and	only	occasionally	to	continue	a	conversational	or	‘dialogue’.	Only	one	user	maintained	a	sustained	presence	and	posted	regularly	(between	February	2013	and	May	2014)	and	had	the	highest	number	of	posts	(16	in	total).				
Table	1.	Number	of	posts	by	individual	contributors	Number	of	contributors	posting	only	once	 63	Number	of	contributors	posting	only	twice	 16	Number	of	contributors	posting	only	3	times	 4	Number	of	contributors	posting	4	times	or	more		 2	
Total	number	of	
contributors	
85			The	data	was	analysed	initially	using	NVivo	to	organise	the	data	into	descriptive	categories.	A	coding	framework	was	developed	in	order	to	categorise	the	postings	in	terms	of	their	discursive	functions.	Two	broad	code	categories	were	made	(legitimising	discourse	and	delegitimising	discourse),	under	which	numerous	sub-codes	were	created	(see	Table	2	for	a	schematic	overview	of	some	of	the	more	common	codes).	Following	this,	a	closer	micro-analysis	was	conducted	involving	the	focussed	exploration	of	a	sub-set	of	the	data	in	order	to	understand	the	category	work	undertaken	by	the	contributors.	In	my	discussion	of	the	data	I	will	make	reference	to	the	number	of	the	post	when	referencing	data,	which	is	its	chronological	position	in	the	thread.	Due	to	restrictions	of	space	I	will	only	present	
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selective	quotations	for	detailed	discussions,	and	I	will	use	the	abbreviations	H	and	OM	instead	of	the	terms	homeopathy	and	orthodox	medicine.		
Table	2:	Overview	of	the	more	common	codes	used	in	the	study	
Legitimising	Discourse	 Delegitimising	Discourse	
Code	name	 Description	 Frequency	 Code	Name	 Description	 Frequency	Experience	of	homeopathy	changing	one’s	views	
Examples	of	how	using	homeopathy	led	to	a	view	that	H	could	be	effective	
13	 Critique	of	homeopathic	evidence	claims	
Criticising	the	types	of	evidence	that	H	uses	to	claim	its	effectiveness	or	legitimacy	
22	
Critique	of	allopathic	medicine	 Criticism	of	the	ideological	position	in	orthodox	medicine	
10	 Scientific	explanations	of	homeopathy	
Providing	a	scientific	explanation	of	why	H	cannot	work	
18	
Problems	of	explanation	by	RCTs	 Discussion	of	the	limited	explanatory	power	of	RCTs		
10	 Need	for	political	control	of	homeopathy	
Requirement	for	governments	or	institutions	to	prevent	H	from	being	practiced	
10	
Importance	of	consumer	choice	 Arguments	around	the	role	of	choice	in	public	healthcare		and	the	importance	of	H	within	that	range	of	choice	
10	 Criticising	the	right	to	choose	Homeopathy	
Arguing	against	the	idea	that	there	is	a	moral	right	to	choose	H	as	a	treatment	regime	
10	
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Analysis 
Othering in homeopathy and allopathic medicine 	A	core	feature	of	the	postings	analysed	here	was	that	there	was	a	strong	polarisation	between	those	who	supported	and	those	who	critiqued	homeopathy.		The	majority	of	the	contributors	(79	posts	in	total)	fell	into	the	latter	category,	with	less	than	half	that	number	(36	posts)	supporting	homeopathy.	A	small	number	of	posts	were	ambiguous	in	their	orientation	(11	posts).	The	remainder	of	this	section	aims	to	analyse	in	detail	the	discursive	practices	through	which	such	positioning	occurred.			Both	legitimising	and	delegitimising	discourse	involved	a	strong	process	of	‘othering’	–	that	is,	of	characterising	the	other	as	being	in	opposition	to	themselves	and,	more	specifically,	as	being	irrational	in	their	views.	In	the	case	of	delegitimising	strategies,	this	involved	aspects	such	as	categorising	homeopathy	an	irrational	form	of	belief	system	equivalent	to	practices	such	as	witchcraft	and	primitive	or	pre-enlightenment	belief	systems.	Within	this	we	can	see	a	dual	process	of	enforcing	an	exclusive	category	distinction	between	H	and	OM,	and	of	creating	H	as	a	‘stigmatised	category’	(Goffman,	1968).	Post	51	provides	an	example:		
belief	in	homeopathy	may	as	well	be	belief	in	magic	-	it	is	unscientific,	mystical	
garbage	based	on	a	ludicrous,	impossible	foundation.	(51)		
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In	this	Post,	through	the	phrase	‘may	as	well’,	which	is	commonly	used	to	make	negative	associations	between	one	phenomena/action	and	another,	the	orientation	to	H	is	made	equivalent	to	an	orientation	to	magic.	As	a	joint	category,	H/Magic	are	then	described	through	two	sets	of	paired	adjectives,	the	first	of	which	(‘unscientific/mystical’)	categorises	H/Magic	while	the	second	(‘ludicrous,	impossible’)	describes	their	‘foundation’.	Further,	the	post	makes	a	juxtaposition	between	‘belief’	and	evidence	(implicated	in	the	category	‘foundation’),	which	further	distinguishes	H	and	its	implied	other	of	OM.			For	homeopaths,	the	‘othering’	strategies	involved	characterising	OM	as,	for	example,	closed	minded,	doctrinal	and	based	on	vested	interests	(see	post	101).		
The	scientific	community	seems	to	have	taken	a	similar	role	to	the	early	
church	in	ridiculing/persecuting	anyone	who	does	not	adhere/believe	in	their	
theories.	(Post	101)		Post	101	creates	a	category	link	between	the	scientific	community	and	‘the	early	church’,	which	it	portrayed	as	a	stigmatised	category	as	the	members	of	it	are	regarded	as	‘ridiculing/persecuting’	non-members	on	the	basis	of	a	lack	of	‘adherence/belief’	in	their	theories.	As	with	Post	51,	it	also	invokes	the	idea	of	‘belief’	as	a	means	of	relativizing	the	fact	claims	of	the	other	as	a	set	of	‘theories’	rather	than	facts.			The	categories	used	to	segregate	H	and	OM	can	be	understood	as	‘moral	devices’	(Housley	and	Fitzgerald,	2003)	that	(a)	enforce	an	exclusive	boundary	difference	
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where	the	two	are	treated	as	separate	domains	and	(b)	stigmatises	the	‘other’	category	as	being	morally	problematic.	This	stigmatised	character	was	developed	in	both	discourses	through	association	with	other	categories	that	are	portrayed	as	dubious	(or	at	least	as	relative),	and	involved	invoking	a	distinction	between	knowledge	and	belief,	using	the	latter	to	relativize	claims	to	fact.			The	category	of	other	was	further	problematized	by	characterising	them	not	just	as	dubious	but	as	actively	dangerous.	For	instance,	Post	109	points	to	beliefs	as	leading	away	from	‘proper	medical	treatment’	(delegitimising	discourse),	while	Post	112	(legitimising	discourse)	referred	to	the	‘harmful’	and	‘aggressive’	nature	of	allopathic	medicine.		
	
There	are	countless	examples	of	people	being	harmed	by	their	belief	in	
homeopathy	and	sometimes	by	the	homeopathic	product	itself.		One	of	the	
serious	issues	is	the	distrust	of	conventional	medicine	and	doctors	that	
homeopathists	frequently	engender.	This	can	mean	that	people	delay	or	
forego	possibly	urgently	needed	medical	treatment	and	that	can	lead	to	
serious	harm	or	even	death.	(Post	109)		
I	personally	think	that	a	lot	of	modern	medicine	is	dangerous	and	more	so	
because	drug	companies	are	allowed	to	test	their	own	drugs	and	publish	their	
findings	when	they	obviously	have	a	vested	interest.	(Post	112)		In	Post	109,	in	addition	to	claiming	that	homeopathic	cures	could	themselves	be	dangerous	(this	was	unusual	–	most	contributors	argued	that	there	could	be	no	
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harm	as	the	substance	was	only	water)	the	author	also	suggests	that	homeopathists	(sic)	enforce	the	binary	of	difference	between	themselves	and	‘conventional	medicine’	and	hypothesise	the	possibility	of	harm	leading	from	patients	not	seeking	treatment	from	OM.	Here,	the	idea	of	a	binary	difference	is	used	not	to	show	why	homeopathy	is	problematic,	but	that	H’s	own	invoking	of	the	binary	is	itself	dangerous	as	it	closes	off	treatment	options	for	the	patients.	In	this	sense,	H	is	described	as	maintaining	itself	as	a	closed	category.	As	we	shall	see,	this	point	was	also	raised	in	legitimising	discourse.			In	Post	112	a	category	‘modern	medicine’	(implicitly	in	contrast	to	H)	is	invoked	and	is	associated	with	drug	companies	who	are	characterised	as	morally	flawed	in	their	practices.	The	characterisation	involves	describing	this	morally	questionable	category	as	breaching	principles	of	bias,	which	of	course	is	a	central	tenet	of	‘scientific	methodology’.	As	we	shall	see,	this	use	of	scientific	principles	and	procedures	of	action	to	de-legitimise	science	was	a	core	aspect	of	legitimising	strategies.			
Belief and evidence  	The	distinction	between	belief	and	evidence	was	a	core	component	of	the	othering	strategies	used	in	delegitimising	discourse.	Post	25	provides	an	example.			
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It	is	immaterial	that	some	people	believe	[homeopathy]	works	when	it	is	
clearly	unscientifically	proven	and	if	it	were	true,	would	overturn	huge	proven	
scientific	certainties	in	other	disciplines.	(Post	25)		Here,	the	contributor	describes	the	adherence	to	H	in	terms	of	a	‘belief’,	which	is	juxtaposed	against	a	second	category	of	‘scientific	proof’	and	truth.	The	contributor	downgrades	the	former	by	invoking	scientific	proof	as	a	requirement	for	how	a	claim	would	move	from	one	category	to	another.	It	also	injects	absurdity	into	the	ideas	that	homeopathic	claims	could	move	category	by	suggesting	that	they	would	have	to	overturn	scientific	proofs	to	do	so.			The	absence	of	orientation	to	evidence	was	critical	to	building	H	as	a	stigmatised	category.	Post	126	invokes	a	moral,	causal	relation	between	knowing	how	science	works	(e.g.	the	phrase	‘read	up	on	the	scientific	method’),	following	the	principles	of	EBM	‘we	practice	evidence	based	medicine’,	and	having	a	professional	duty	of	care	to	patients	(‘…doing	the	best	for	our	patients’).	Here,	the	duty	of	care	can	be	seen	to	work	as	something	like	a	‘category	predicate’	(Jayyusi,	2014)	that	is	implicit	in	the	notion	of	EBM.			
For	those	people	who	dispute	this	saying	that	“it	doesn't	have	to	have	clinical	
evidence	for	it	to	work”,	please	go	back	to	your	science	classes	and	read	up	on	
the	scientific	method.	We	practice	evidence	based	medicine	so	that	we	can	be	
sure	that	we	are	doing	the	best	for	our	patients.	To	do	anything	else	would	be	
an	affront	to	the	oath	that	we	took	as	doctors	“first	do	no	harm”.	Oh	wait,	silly	
me,	Homeopaths	aren’t	doctors.	(Post	126).			 	
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	The	referencing	of	evidence	over	belief	involves	two	interrelated	claims	–	firstly,	a	call	to	evidence	as	a	means	of	making	judgement	of	effectiveness	(and	frequently,	specifically,	to	evidence-based	practice)	and,	secondly,	an	insistence	on	the	‘rightness’	of	science	as	a	logical	schema	of	explanation.	In	terms	of	evidence,	Post	19	epitomises	many	posts	in	pointing	to	the	strong	preference	for	scientific	
evidence	and	medical	(clinical)	trials	as	an	evaluative	marker,	but	also	to	the	‘proper’	evaluation	of	such	evidence.	The	post	specifies	that	particular	kinds	of	evidence	are	needed	-	i.e.	not	just	any	‘medical	trials’	but	trials	that	are	‘professionally	conducted’.	Here,	the	posts	differentiate	within	scientific	evidence	between	that	which	is	professional/proper	and,	by	implication,	that	which	is	not.		
	
As	far	as	I	am	aware,	no	professionally	conducted	medical	trial	has	ever	
shown	homeopathy	to	work	at	all.	It	has	never	been	shown	to	be	better	than	
placebo.	(Post	19)		Just	as	evidence	is	the	core	referent	for	undermining	homeopathy,	so	it	formed	a	key	aspect	of	how	legitimising	discourse	justified	the	validity	of	their	claims.		One	of	the	common	strategies	for	invoking	evidence	to	legitimise	homeopathy	involved	what	I	describe	as	a	‘revelatory	tale’,	where	a	contributor	describes	moving	from	a	point	of	scepticism	to	one	of	acceptance	through	having	tried	the	remedies.	For	example,	Post	108	describes	a	change	in	attitudes	to	homeopathy	as	a	result	of	observing	its	effectiveness.			
Current	Sociology	0(0)	
	 18	
I	was	all	sceptical	before	and	put	down	homeopathy	as	'collective	delusion'	
'fake'	everything	,	until	I	saw	my	uncle	whose	whole	body	was	covered	with	
warts...no	effective	treatment	for	him	until	he	visited	a	homeopath	and	Thuja	
cured	the	condition	completely	within	a	few	months.	(Post	108).		Post	13	produces	a	similar	story,	describing	a	long-term	health	problem	which	improved	and	led	to	a	change	in	attitude	towards	homeopathy	and	to	allopathic	medicine,	again	invoking	the	idea	of	OM	as	harmful	by	comparing	it	to	‘engine	degreaser’.			
I	have	suffered	for	years	of	scalp	problems	itchy	and	flaky	until	I	switched	to	
all	natural.	My	hair	glows	now	and	I	never	touch	engine	degreaser	again	that	
actually	adds	to	long	term	health	damage.	(Post	13)		The	revelatory	tale	involves	showing	how	new	attitudes	emerge	from	experience	of	using	homeopathy,	and	of	having	been	converted	to	this	mode	after	using	other	kinds	of	drug	treatments.	Through	this	type	of	strategy,	legitimising	discourse	displayed	an	awareness	that	appealing	to	experience	breached	a	preference	for	‘scientific’	evidence,	and	clearly	undertook	discursive	work	to	build	the	case	for	their	divergent	position.	This	was	also	the	case	for	the	few	comments	that	displayed	less	clear	orientation	to	either	a	‘legitimising’	or	‘delegitimising’	position,	such	as	post	104.		
I'm	about	to	commence	a	6	week	course	of	herbal	potions	recommended	by	a	
kinesiologist	for	constant	severe	fatigue,	headaches	and	IBS.	I	have	an	open	
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mind	but	probably	more	on	the	'not	likely'	side	rather	than	the	"very	
plausible'!	I	am	undertaking	this	as	an	option	based	on	a	year	of	watching	a	
work	colleague	get	cured	of	her	migraines,	and	her	husband	finding	a	cure	for	
his	excema,	and	their	friend	finding	similar	success	for	her	health	issues.	If	this	
was	all	mumbo	jumbo	there	wouldn't	be	a	debate	at	all	as	no	one	would	be	
getting	better!	  Placebo?	Maybe?	Do	I	care?	(Post	104)		Post	104	justifies	their	decision	to	take	homeopathy	with	reference	to	seeing	a	work	colleague	being	cured.	In	formulating	this,	the	contributor	displays	an	awareness	of	the	binary	debate	between	H’s	effectiveness,	aligning	themselves	with	scientific	rationality	(‘more	on	the	‘not	likely’	side’).	However,	later	they	orientate	more	explicitly	to	a	defence	of	the	possible	value	of	H,	saying	‘if	this	was	all	mumbo	jumbo	there	wouldn't	be	a	debate	at	all’	
	What	we	see	in	these	two	forms	of	discourse	is	the	production	of	different	categories	of	evidence:	in	delegitimising	discourse,	evidence	is	equated	with	scientific	evidence,	particularly	EBM,	while	in	legitimising	discourse	it	is	commonly	equated	with	the	experience	of	using	homeopathy.		The	revelatory	tale	builds	a	moral	relationship	between	experience	and	rationality.	Indeed,	a	particularly	common	critique	levelled	at	critics	of	homeopathy	was	the	absence	of	such	experience,	where	the	reliance	on	evidence	abstracted	from	experienced	is	treated	as	morally	problematic.	I	will	return	on	to	this	point	shortly.		
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Explanations 	Both	of	the	discursive	forms	used	strategies	to	undermine	the	other’s	claims	about	the	relevance	of	evidence.	In	delegitimising	discourse,	this	involve	re-interpreting	the	perceived	‘successes’	of	homeopathic	treatment	by	offering	alternative	scientific	explanations.	The	central	mechanism	for	this	involved	invoking	the	concept	of	placebo.	Post	63	gives	a	useful	example:			
Homeopathy	is	not	medicine.	It	is	wholly	unacceptable	to	present	Homeopathy	
as	a	credible	alternative	to	evidence-based	medicine,	when	there	is	ample	
evidence	that	clearly	shows	that	Homeopathy	at	its	best	only	acts	as	a	
placebo;	more	commonly,	it	does	not	work	and	delays	proper	medical	
treatment.	(post	63)		The	post	starts	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	binary	difference	between	H	and	OM	and	goes	on	to	say	that	the	evidence	shows	that	H	does	not	work,	and	acts	only	as	a	placebo,	linking	this	with	the	idea	that	it	can	be	dangerous	in	delaying	‘proper’	(orthodox	medical)	treatment.	In	some	instances,	it	is	homeopathic	remedies	that	are	described	as	placebos,	and	other	times	it	is	‘homeopathy’	as	a	practice	or	discipline.		The	function	of	the	concept	of	placebo	in	general	terms	is	to	place	the	explanation	for	any	health	improvement	on	some	cause	other	than	homeopathic	cures.	The	
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alternative	(scientific)	explanations	that	were	given	for	why	homeopathy	might	work	(or	might	be	perceived	as	working)	came	in	two	forms.	Firstly,	several	posts	pointed	to	the	possible	benefits	of	water	as	a	cleaning	agent;	post	10,	for	example,	takes	up	a	response	of	the	‘placebo’	critique	raised	in	a	previous	post,	which	had	highlighted	that	the	placebo	explanation	could	not	account	for	the	successful	use	of	homeopathy	in	animals.	In	reply	to	this,	the	author	of	Post	10	notes	that:			
Would	you	believe	me	if	I	told	you	children	and	animals	do	benefit	from	the	
placebo	effect.	6	month	old	teething	babies	like	the	sugar	content	in	
homeopathic	pills,	next	time	save	yourself	a	fortune	and	buy	sugar	cubes.  I	
dont	know	the	medical	history	of	your	cat	but	I	would	assume	that	after	all	
the	eye-drops	and	other	irritants	your	vet	prescribed,	3	days	of	bathing	with	
distilled	water	would	do	wonders	for	the	moggys	eyes.	Homeopathy	has	a	very	
good	track	record	for	treating	things	that	would	get	better	anyway…	(Post	
10)		In	the	final	sentence,	the	author	notes	that	the	‘cures’	claimed	to	be	the	result	of	homeopathy	may	be	explained	in	terms	of	unrelated	health	improvements,	what	other	posts	characterise	as	a	‘natural	healing	process’.	Here,	the	causal	relation	between	homeopathic	cure	and	health	improvement	is	questioned,	so	that	the	notion	of	‘effect’	is	removed	entirely	from	the	treatment	itself.	The	discourse	of	de-legitimation	also	involved	critiquing	the	theoretical	explanations	that	underlie	homeopathy.	The	basic	idea	that	was	articulated	by	a	number	of	posts	involved	arguing	that	to	accept	homeopathy	involved	abandoning	scientific	principles	(e.g.	post	76).	
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If	f	it	worked	then	substantial	numbers	of	other	well	evidenced	and	well	tested	
theories	in	physics,	chemistry,	biology	and	medicine	all	would	have	to	be	
wrong.	(Post	76)		Often,	participants	gave	alternative	explanations	in	terms	of	science	as	to	why	homeopathy’s	explanations	cannot	be	right.	For	example,	Post	1	notes	that:		
The	molecules	of	any	liquid	are	constantly	being	bumped	by	other	molecules	-	
what	physicists	call	thermal	  fluctuations	-	so	that	they	lose	any	'memory"	of	
their	past	configuration	within	a	fraction	of	a	second.	(Post	1)		The	critique	of	the	concept	of	placebo	effect	was	a	key	aspect	of	the	discourse	of	legitimisation.	To	take	Post	95	as	an	example,	the	contributor	creates	a	general	category	of	shared	opinion	(‘most	observers’)	that	is	used	to	set	up	a	feature	of	the	placebo	effect	being	transient.	This	is	then	contrasted	with	the	prolonged	effects	of	homeopathy,	removing	the	logical	link	between	placebo	and	H.			
Most	observers	accept	that	that	placebo	effect	is	transient.	This	does	not	
explain	the	effect	of	prolonged	relieve	after	one	or	two	homeopathic	tablets	
given	for	chronic	conditions.	(Post	95)		A	common	strategy	was	to	suggest	that	instead	of	working	as	an	‘explanation’	the	notion	of	placebo	actually	functioned	as	a	belief.		Post	93	starts	with	a	revelation	about	how	homeopathy	worked	for	them,	made	a	claim	to	its	lack	of	harm	
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compared	to	allopathic	medicine	(‘doesn't	poison	my	system’)	and	a	critique	of	the	notion	of	placebo	as	a	belief	rather	than	an	explanation.			
It	is	clear	to	me	that	before	taking	my	homeopathic	remedy	I	was	sick.  It	is	
obvious	to	me	that	after	taking	it	my	complaint	improved	at	first	and	in	time	i	
was	healed.  It	is	clear	to	me	that	an	inexpensive	medication	that	makes	me	
feel	better	does	have	my	full	attention	especially	if	it	doesn't	poison	my	system	
in	the	healing	process.  It	is	obvious	to	me	that	I	shall	continue	using	this	
system	of	medicine	and	I	shall	recommend	it	to	friends	and	family. Placebo?	
Feel	free	to	believe	what	you	will. But	perhaps	you	would	like	to	try	it.	(Post	
93)			The	final	line	in	the	extract	of	post	93	was	itself	a	common	device	from	the	legitimising	posters	–i.e.		criticising	the	‘rationalising	away’	of	homeopathy	without	having	experienced	it.	For	example,	posts	Post	119	brings	the	concepts	of	professionalism	and	experience	together	as	alternatives	to	scientific	evidence.			
Just	because	there	is	no	“scientific	evidence”	doesn't	mean	that	homeopathy	
doesn't	work.	It	is	sometimes	a	case	of	trial	and	error	but	a	good	experienced	
practitioner	(and	I	am	pleased	to	have	known	a	few)	will	invariably	get	it	
right.	I	think	the	sceptics	should	try	it	before	dismissing	it	out	of	hand.	(Post	
119)		Here	the	notion	of	scientific	evidence	is	invoked	as	a	problematic	category	through	quote	marks,	and	one	that	is	relative	and	incomplete.	In	this	way,	the	notion	that	
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scientific	evidence	is	the	only	resource	for	deciding	matters	of	efficacy	is	problematized,	and,	in	turn,	broadening	the	category	of	evidence.	In	its	place,	the	notion	of	professionalism	in	homeopathy	is	presented	as	a	means	of	explaining	how	homeopathy	may	work.		
	Another	quite	different	and	much	less	common	approach	involved	drawing	on	clinical	trials	to	make	claims	that	homeopathy	can	be	seen	to	work,	even	in	the	terms	of	EBM.	Rather	than	differentiating	homeopathy,	this	strategy	involved	a	common	form	of	discursive	positioning	found	in	other	forms	of	CAM	(Barcan,	2011;	Salkeld,	2005;	Welsh	et	al.,	2004)	of	fitting	the	homeopathic	tradition	into	the	EBM	framework.	In	Post	3,	the	author	uses	a	highly	rational	academic	discourse	to	cite	findings	from	clinical	trials,	using	a	conventional	academic	referencing	form	to	show	the	sources	of	those	claims.			
44%	of	randomised	controlled	trials	in	homeopathy	have	reported	positive	
effects,	and	only	7%	have	been	negative.	These	data	are	similar	to	the	findings	
of	a	comprehensive	meta-analysis	of	placebo-controlled	trials	of	homeopathy	
(Linde	et	al.,	Lancet	1997;	vol	350:	pp834–43),	in	which	48%	of	trials	were	
positive.    It	should	also	be	noted	that	different	homeopathic	remedies	and	
different	dilutions	of	the	same	remedy	have	been	distinguished	from	each	
other	using	Raman	and	infrared	spectroscopy,	even	though	all	should	
theoretically	contain	nothing	but	water	(Rao	et	al.,	Homeopathy	2007;	vol	96:	
pp175–182).	Such	findings	may	relate	to	complex	processes	such	as	the	
formation,	during	succussion,	of	colloidal	nanobubbles	that	could	contain	the	
remedy	source	material.	(Post	3)	
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EBM	versus	Choice	
	The	moral	claims	to	the	appropriateness	or	otherwise	of	homeopathy	extended	to	the	NHS	website	itself.	18	of	the	delegitimising	posts	made	a	claim	to	the	problematic	nature	of	the	NHS	choice	website.	Post	70	exemplifies	many	of	the	other	posts	in	its	rhetorical	structure.			
Like	many	of	the	commentators	here,	I	am	disturbed	by	the	anodyne	and	
bland	commentary	you	offer	on	homeopathy.  Given	your	stated	purpose	of	
being	a	trusted	and	authoritative	voice	on	matters	medical,	ignoring	the	
wealth	of	trial	data	that	show	homeopathy	to	be	-at	best-	no	better	than	
placebo	is	an	abrogation	of	your	responsibilities.  It	is	difficult	not	to	
conclude	that	the	recent	press	commentary	stories	alleging	undue	influence	
by	vested	interests	are	correct.	NHS	treatments	spend	taxpayers	money.	Only	
those	treatments	with	a	strong	evidence	base	should	be	used.	Spending	NHS	
money	on	homeopathy	is	wrong.		(Post	70)		The	post	begins	by	making	a	strong	allegiance	to	the	other	critiques	of	the	website	by	invoking	the	idea	that	the	website	should	have	‘moral	responsibility’	by	being	‘trustworthy’,	which	in	turn	is	linked	to	the	category	of	‘authority’.	The	post	then	refers	to	the	presence	of	data	refuting	H’s	effectiveness,	again	implementing	the	explanation	of	placebo.	The	post	goes	on	to	reference	the	media	debates	that	I	described	earlier,	and	the	claims	that	NHS	had	been	corrupted.	Finally,	the	post	
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invokes	the	idea	that	‘strong	evidence’	should	be	used	to	support	the	use	of	treatments.		
	Post	70	encompasses	many	of	the	points	we	have	seen	already,	but	extends	the	claims	by	making	the	case	that	not	only	is	homeopathy	morally	problematic,	but	the	website	itself	is	operating	in	a	morally	corrupt	way,	specifically,	by	failing	to	use	evidence	to	display	the	position	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	homeopathy	works.	This	argument	mirrors	the	ideas	of	EBM	that	clinical	trials	are	the	most	appropriate	evidence	source	for	judging	appropriateness.	In	terms	of	category	work,	‘appropriate’	care	is	made	equivalent	to	‘evidence-based	care’.			This	contrasts	strikingly	with	a	different	discursive	practice	that	involved	emphasising	diversity	in	choice	as	a	mechanism	for	making	decisions	about	treatment.	The	notion	of	choice	was	invoked	as	a	means	of	describing	a	pluralistic	health	service	and	was	often	tied	up	with	the	notion	of	the	limits	of	EBM	as	a	form	of	evidence.	For	instance,	Post	112	begins	by	discrediting	criticism	that	are	not	based	on	personal	experience,	and	then	invokes	the	notion	of	choice	(as	present	in	the	title	of	the	website)	as	a	way	of	describing	plurality	in	healthcare,	and	of	course	giving	some	authority	to	this	idea	by	linking	it	to	the	website	itself.		This	notion	of	patient	choice	was	commonly	invoked	and	often	in	the	same	way	as	in	Post	112,	i.e.	by	linking	it	to	a	discrediting	of	scientific	explanations.			
I	am	disgusted	in	the	way	homeopathic	medicine	is	being	discredited	by	
people	who	have	probably	not	even	tried	it. Also	I	thought	this	website	was	
called	NHS	Choices	(Post	112)	
Gibson	
	 27	
	Finally,	in	the	small	number	of	posts	that	made	a	less	strong	orientation	towards	a	critique	or	defence	of	homeopathy,	choice	was	the	common	discourse	used	to	justify	an	orientation	to	homeopathy.			
I	like	to	use	a	combination	of	medical	and	complementary	healthcare	but	
have	never	been	quite	sure	about	the	principles	of	homeopathy.	I	think	it's	
great	that	the	NHS	have	laid	out	all	the	facts	about	homeopathy	simply	and	
clearly.	Not	sure	I	believe	it	can	really	work	but	it's	good	to	have	all	the	
evidence	to	hand	to	make	up	my	own	mind. VA	(Post	12)		Post	12	is	typical	of	such	contributions,	which	tended	to	display	a	sensitivity	to	the	spoilt	identity	of	homeopathy	in	terms	of	its	breaching	scientific	knowledge	(as	in	‘never	quite	sure	about	the	principles	of	homeopathy’),	but	then	used	the	notion	of	individual	choice	as	a	means	of	signalling	a	possible	(although	here,	not	disclosed)	orientation	to	homeopathy.	Again,	very	often,	these	kinds	of	claims	were	also	bolstered	through	a	revelatory	tale	to	show	why	homeopathy	had	been	used	in	spite	of	the	lack	of	scientific	evidence.			
	
Conclusions 	The	analysis	presented	above	shows	that	the	relationship	between	homeopathy	and	orthodox	medicine	was	constructed	by	the	participants	in	the	forum	as	a	
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‘schism’,	where	the	differences	in	practice	and	ideology	were	stigmatised	on	both	sides.	In	the	negotiation	over	the	‘heretical	position’	(Jones,	2004)	of	homeopathy	the	concept	of	evidence	played	a	key	role,	operating	as	an	unstable	category	as	participants	invoked	different	conceptions	of	what	was	to	count	as	evidence:	namely,	EBM	in	delegitimising	discourse	and	experience	(through	a	revelatory	tale)	in	legitimising	discourse.	Contributors	with	less	clear	orientations	to	either	position	tended	to	present	explicit	preferences	for	EBM	and	scientific	evidence,	but	often	also	invoked	notions	of	experience	to	justify	using	homeopathy.		The	practice	of	‘assimilation’	that	has	been	identified	in	other	forms	of	CAM	(Degele,	2005;	Salkeld,	2005;	Welsh	et	al.,	2004)	was	not	strongly	present	within	the	forum	analysed	here.	Instead,	contributors	who	defended	homeopathy	tended	to	do	so	by	enforcing	a	category	distinction	between	their	practices	and	those	found	in	orthodox	medicine.	Contributors	did,	however,	make	reference	to	scientific	principles	(particularly	bias	and	objectivity)	as	a	means	of	stigmatising	orthodox	medicine,	so	that	scientific	principles	were	mostly	used	not	for	assimilation,	but	to	further	stigmatise	science	as	a	‘hypocritical’	category.	Further,	the	critiques	of	EBM	found	in	the	medical	community	(Friedson,	1988;	Goldenberg,	2006;	Greenhalgh,	2006;	Kirmayer,	2012)	were	not	present	in	the	ways	that	delegitimising	discourse	dealt	with	evidence.	Instead,	EBM	was	employed	as	an	ideological	device	to	criticise	an	alternative	evidence	framework.			Ultimately,	the	substantive	issue	for	the	NHS	is	whether	or	not	to	continue	funding	homeopathy	as	an	integrated	part	of	healthcare	practice.		A	question	emerges	about	what	kind	of	evidence	may	be	useful	to	help	the	NHS	to	address	this	
Gibson	
	 29	
question.		In	the	debates	around	the	clinical	evidence	for	or	against	homeopathy	it	is	common	for	people	to	call	for	more	clinical	trials	to	establish	its	levels	of	effectiveness	(Mathie,	2015).	An	implication	of	the	analysis	presented	here	is	that,	given	the	different	interpretations	and	definitions	of	evidence	that	the	contributors	provided,	public	opinion	(and	practice)	may	not	be	substantially	altered	by	clinical	trials	alone.	In	part,	this	is	because	the	model	of	rational	choice	informed	decision-making	and	the	conceptions	of	evidence	that	underlie	it	bear	little	relations	to	the	discourse	practices	analysed	in	the	previous	section.	The	forum	contributors	were	engaged	in	a	process	of	ideological	positioning	in	which	the	very	category	of	‘evidence’	was	used	divergently.		A	key	reason	for	the	instability	of	the	category	‘evidence’	is	that	through	its	provision	by	the	NHS,	homeopathy	is	gives	institutional	legitimacy,	not	just	as	a	healthcare	practice,	but	as	an	alternative	evidence	framework.	This	was	evident	in	the	way	that	the	members	of	the	forum	held	the	NHS	accountable	to	competing	definitions	of	evidence	and	information.	While	clinical	trials	are	of	course	valuable	forms	of	evidence,	in	the	context	of	homeopathy,	enforcing	one	mode	of	evidence	over	another	may	be	insufficient;	perhaps	a	key	issue	here	is	not	just	‘what	is	the	evidence’	but	also	‘what	do	people	understand	by	evidence’	and	‘what	do	people	do	with	evidence’.			One	of	the	limitations	of	this	paper	is	that	it	has	dealt	with	a	tiny	population	of	people	in	a	very	transitory	online	space:	as	other	researchers	have	argued	(Fischer	et	al.,	2014),	very	little	is	known	about	public	attitudes	towards	homeopathy,	and	further	study	of	this	is	critical	to	understanding	the	extent	of	the	types	of	
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phenomena	reported	here.	However,	to	follow	one	of	the	arguments	that	is	central	to	the	methodological	framework	of	conversation	analysis,	attitudes	are	a	fundamentally	different	order	of	phenomena	to	social	practices,	and	exploring	how	populations	feel	or	talk	about	homeopathy	is	a	poor	guide	to	understand	their	practices	of	engagement.	From	that	point	of	view,	a	further	limitation	of	this	study	and	of	much	research	in	CAM	is	that	it	reports	not	on	what	people	do	with	homeopathy,	but	on	their	construction	of	attitudes,	be	it	in	public	or	private	spheres.	If	the	NHS	really	wants	to	understand	the	lived	realities	of	pluralistic	healthcare,	then	explorations	of	how	people	use	homeopathy	will	be	a	critical	source	of	evidence.			
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